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Abstract
In recent years, the use of information technologies in Critical Infrastructures is gradually increasing. Although this brings 
benefits, it also increases the possibility of security attacks. Despite the availability of various advanced incident handling 
techniques and tools, there is still no easy, structured, standardized and trusted way to manage and forecast interrelated 
cybersecurity incidents. This paper introduces CyberSANE, a novel dynamic and collaborative, warning and response sys-
tem, which supports security officers and operators to recognize, identify, dynamically analyse, forecast, treat and respond 
to security threats and risks and and it guides them to handle effectively cyber incidents. The components of CyberSANE 
are described along with a description of the CyberSANE data flow. The main novelty of the CyberSANE system is the 
fact that it enables the combination of active incident handling approaches with reactive approaches to support incidents 
of compound, highly dependent Critical Information Infrastructures. The benefits and added value of using CyberSANE is 
described with the aid of a set of cyber-attack scenarios.
Keywords Incident handling · Web mining · Data fusion · Risk assessment
1 Introduction
Over the past decade, critical infrastructures are operating 
upon robust and reliable ICT implementations of emerg-
ing technologies (e.g. IoT, Cloud Computing, Big Data), 
which are interconnected through complex, heterogeneous 
networks, providing a high level of flexibility, scalability, 
and efficiency on the provided services and the supported 
processes. The increased usage of information technology 
in such scenario increases the benefits for Critical Infor-
mation Infrastructures (CIIs) but it also makes them more 
susceptible to malicious activities and cyber attacks from 
various types of adversaries (e.g. hackers, terrorist groups, 
criminal gangs and rogue states).
Nowadays, barriers to entry for would-be cyber crimi-
nals are falling rapidly because the attackers have a range 
of (technical) capabilities and substantial resources at their 
disposal, since malware and malware-as-a service have 
become more easily and cheaply available through vari-
ous means and sources (such as Dark Web, Deep Web). As 
a result, a variety of advanced techniques and tools (e.g. 
social engineering techniques and zero-day exploits pro-
grams) are available and can be used by cyber criminals 
to initiate advanced targeted attacks. Such attacks employ 
multiple technologies and are deployed in multiple stages 
in order to penetrate an organization’s defenses. The attack 
vectors vary significantly from Application-Layer, Social 
Engineering Unauthorized Access, Malicious Code, and 
Reconnaissance and Networking-based service attacks 
that target applications, host and client operating systems 
and even networking equipment. In such context, attack-
ers use these techniques to get valuable data assets, such 
as financial transaction information, user credentials, and 
insider information. Moreover, in many cases, attackers take 
advantage of the interconnected nature of modern systems to 
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attack third parties. Novel multi-stage attacks can be used to 
exploit vulnerabilities of interconnected ICT systems beyond 
organizational boundaries, enabling attackers to move across 
multiple businesses and systems. In such scenario, attackers 
can use an infrastructure as the stepping stone to attack and 
compromise the security of a dependent organization.
Over the last few years, industrial societies are bombarded 
daily with headlines and reports on major cyber-attacks, new 
malware strains or insidious social engineering techniques 
that adversaries use to attack ICTs. In particular, CIIs have 
become lately targets for cyberattacks attracting the atten-
tion of security researchers, cyber-criminals, hacktivists 
(e.g. Anonymous, LulzSec) and other such role-players (e.g. 
cyber-spies). These cyber actors have evolved their tactics, 
techniques and procedures to an unruly extent, making next-
generation malware toolkits available in various locations 
through the internet (e.g. Deep Web, Dark Web) and adopt-
ing new data exfiltration methods that give them an asym-
metric quantum leap in capability. In the past years, critical 
infrastructures have been affected by numerous cybersecu-
rity meltdowns and high-profile breaches.
In this context, appropriate incident handling solutions 
are necessary to support and facilitate the detection and 
analysis of cyber-attacks and threats on Critical Informa-
tion Infrastructures, and to increase operators knowledge 
on cyber risks. Nevertheless, existing digital approaches 
are unlikely to stop an attack in real time, as they fail to 
capture and correlate, in an appropriate degree, events and 
information associated with cyber attacks in complex CIIs. 
Furthermore, existing incident handling approaches are too 
slow, ineffective, not taking into consideration the hetero-
geneity and complexity of ICT systems and the underlying 
infrastructures, and not providing enough insight into the 
real causes of the cybersecurity incidents.
This paper proposes CyberSANE, a novel approach, 
which aims to improve the detection and analysis of cyber-
attacks and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) on CIIs and 
increase the knowledge of the current cyber threat landscape. 
In particular, the CyberSANE system supports organisations 
to raise their preparedness, improve their cooperation with 
each other, and adopt appropriate steps to manage security 
risks, and to report and handle security incidents. The rest 
of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses 
the current cybersecurity status in CIIs of three critical sec-
tors of the European and global economy: Transportation, 
Healthcare and Energy. Section 3 presents related work in 
Security Incident Handling, Threat Intelligence and Infor-
mation Sharing. Section  4 introduces the CyberSANE 
approach, while Sect. 5 goes more in depth and describes the 
CyberSANE system and its key components. Section 6 anal-
yses the data flows of the CyberSANE components and the 
overall system operation. The application of the CyberSANE 
system to a number of demonstration scenarios alongside a 
discussion of the benefits and added value of CyberSANE 
are presented in Sect. 7. Section 8 reflects the innovative 
aspects of the system, while Sect. 9 draws the conclusions 
of this work.
2  Critical information infrastructures 
cybersecurity status
This section provides a summary on the cybersecurity status 
of three critical industrial sectors of the European and global 
economy: Transportation, Health and Energy.
2.1  Transportation cybersecurity status
Although transportation stakeholders do not publish unified 
figures about their cybersecurity status, data provided by 
the reports of independent cybersecurity firms attribute the 
cyber attacks rise to the lack of adequate training, best prac-
tices and cybersecurity standards with compulsory imple-
mentation. Despite the lack of consolidated transportation 
cybersecurity figures, the qualitative information available 
confirms that though transportation stakeholders are han-
dling constantly increasing volumes of information, many 
of them are still working with obsolete legacy ICT systems, 
which raises their cyber vulnerability. In fact, the overall 
low sense of urgency and cybersecurity awareness in com-
bination with the constantly increasing volumes of informa-
tion exchanged and the ICT complexity makes transporta-
tion stakeholders, particularly, vulnerable to cyber-attacks, 
which can result in severe transportation services disrup-
tions. Notwithstanding, the transport industry increasingly 
relies on ICTs to enable essential transportation operations 
(i.e. navigation, propulsion, freight management, traffic con-
trol, etc.) transportation regulations and policies, consider-
ing only the physical aspects of security and safety. This 
might be partially explained by the low number of known 
cybersecurity incidents incurred in the transportation sector, 
which did not create sufficient media exposure to trigger 
bold reaction from the stakeholders involved. Looking at 
the bigger picture, when it comes to the global cybersecurity 
market, the estimated cost of cyber-crime in 2017 amounts 
to $100bn, whereas in 2014, 81% of large organisations suf-
fered from cyber attacks, the average cost of which varied 
from $900 K to $2.3 M (MTI Network 2015). Considering 
these facts, ENISA has published the Cybersecurity Act on 
13.09.2017 attempting to pave the way for the rollout of 
new products and services for cyber protection across the 
Member States. In light of this, the European Commision 
(EC) has proposed the “European Cybersecurity Certifica-
tion Framework for ICT products and services” aiming to 
reduce the cost of the cybersecurity certification, improve 
its effectiveness and make it more commercially attractive 
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for European organisations. Concerning the low maturity 
of cybersecurity awareness among the transportation world, 
most of the stakeholders invest less than the expected in 
fortifying their digital assets. Only transportation opera-
tors, such as the Port of Rotterdam, are able to demonstrate 
specific cybersecurity investments. However, the effort of 
the EC to raise cybersecurity awareness paves the way for 
engaging more transportation stakeholders to devote budgets 
on cybersecurity solutions.
2.2  Healthcare cybersecurity status
According to SANS reports (Filkins 2016), given the highly 
sensitive nature of data processed, healthcare is among the 
top 5 vertical industries with the highest spending on cyber-
security with standard annual budgets up to $600 k. Tak-
ing into account the recent impose of GDPR, it is expected 
that these investments will be increased in order to meet the 
stricter requirements of the regulation. Despite these invest-
ments, it has been reported that several medical IT systems 
are severely outdated (Mukherjee 2017) rendering health 
CIIs extremely vulnerable to a new class of hackers who 
target sensitive patients’ information (i.e. medical records, 
credit cards, etc.). Additionally, reports show that apart from 
external factors, insiders are responsible for a great number 
of security incidents, which confirms that insiders are the 
biggest threat in healthcare (Widup 2018).
2.3  Energy cybersecurity status
Similarly to the transportation sector, cybersecurity aware-
ness is also low in the energy industry. According to (Scott 
2018), the booming expansion of IoT technologies entails 
the interconnection of the energy grids with a constantly 
increasing number of smart devices (Scott 2018). Therefore, 
the possibility of a cyberattack firing physical damages is 
higher than ever before. Concerning the abovementioned 
and that Energy is an asset-intensive industry with many 
remote and hazardous sites, this sector adopted digitisation 
rather late. In further detail, although most energy industry 
executives (76%) have cited that business interruption due 
to cyber-attacks is the most impactful loss of their organisa-
tion, more than half of them could not quantify or did not 
even know what their worst possible loss exposures could 
be (Marsh report 2018).
3  Current efforts in security incident 
handling, threat intelligence 
and information sharing
3.1  Incident handling in critical information 
infrastructures
The main goal of a security incident handling and response 
process is to define the top concerns in managing a secu-
rity breach/incident/event (West-Brown et al. 2003a; Wiik 
and Kossakowski 2005). In practice, choosing the right 
approach for incident handling proves to be a difficult 
decision. In recent years, a number of security incident 
response approaches and frameworks (British Standards 
Institution 2011; Cichonski and Scarfone 2012; ENISA 
2019; Northcutt 2003; Vangelos 2011; Werlinger et al. 
2010; Khurana et al. 2009; Grobauer and Schreck 2010; 
Monfared and Jaatun 2012; Line 2013; Cusick and Ma 
2010; Connell et al. 2013) have been introduced by the 
research and industrial communities and various stand-
ardization bodies. Even though many of these approaches 
provide useful technical guidelines, aiming to enhance 
the security incident response capabilities of the organi-
zations, they demonstrate significant limitations. In par-
ticular, Grimes (Grimes 2007) argues that most of the 
existing incident response approaches follow a linear 
process that is outdated and does not support the highly 
efficient capability that is required to handle and manage 
today’s incidents. Therefore, a progression flaw exists 
in these processes, since if one phase in the linear pro-
cess is not completed, the entire process cycle may stop 
midstream. According to another research work, current 
incident response processes are too focused on the con-
tainment, eradication, and recovery-related activities and 
usually ignore, skip or do not emphasize on other impor-
tant steps of incident management, such as investigations 
actions (Ahmad et al. 2012). The proposal of Shedden 
et al. (2011) gives emphasis on proactive preparation and 
reactive learning to encourage security incident learning. 
The existing incident handling approaches do not provide 
adequate guidance on how to conduct effective forensic 
investigations (Casey 2006; Nnoli et al. 2012; Tan et al. 
2003). Hence, current methods’ limitation to assist and 
guide the investigators in the forensic evidence analysis, 
undermines the value of the evidence and fails to promote 
incident resolution.
Most of the available security information and event 
management solutions lack significant reactive and post-
incident capabilities for managing incidents and events 
in the scope of the ICT-based CIIs, providing inadequate 
technical guidance to the incident response professionals 
on how to detect, investigate and reproduce attacks. As 
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such, despite the socioeconomic importance of tools and 
techniques for handling incidents, there is still no easy, 
structured, standardized and trusted way to manage and 
forecast interrelated cybersecurity incidents taking into 
account the heterogeneity and complexity of the CIIs and 
the increasingly sophisticated types of attacks. Therefore, 
there is a pressing need for devising novel systems for 
efficient CIIs incident handling and providing a thorough 
and common understanding of cyber-attack situations in 
a timely manner.
To sum up, the main limitations of the existing approaches 
(FireEye 2013; Grispos et al. 2014; Ab Rahman and Choo 
2015) can be summarized as follows: (1) the traditional lin-
ear incident response models are too slow, ineffective and do 
not support the highly efficient capability that is required to 
handle and manage today’s incidents; (2) the focus is mostly 
on the proactive element (i.e. provide assistance and infor-
mation to help prepare, protect, and secure) of the incident 
management; (3) current approaches do not provide enough 
insight into the underlying causes of the incident; (4) poor 
provisions for incident planning; (5) undermine the value 
of forensic evidence possibly required for subsequent legal 
action; (6) do not consider the risk-related results produced 
by existing risk assessment methodologies.
In contrast, our work provides a novel integrated approach 
that detects malicious activities, and it provides a thorough 
analysis of the detected anomalies in a more efficient, elastic 
and scalable reasoning way. To achieve this, it combines 
active approaches, which detect and analyse anomaly activi-
ties and attacks in real-time, with reactive approaches, which 
provide a thorough analysis of the underlying infrastructure, 
in order to assess the reported incident.
3.2  Attack scenarios and evidence graph 
representation
Over the last few years, a significant amount of effort has 
been invested in representing evidence and attack scenar-
ios, using a variety of graphs. These attempts are using a 
variety of mathematical formula and algorithms to produce 
and generate the attack patterns (Leucari 2012). Never-
theless, most of them have significant limitations, as they 
just provide a high-level, abstract view of a complex attack 
(Swiler et al. 2001). Representative examples of these types 
of investigation graphs include scenario graphs, forensics 
graphs, logic exploitation graphs, attack graphs, and evi-
dence graphs (Neralla et al. 2013). In this context, Wang 
and Daniels (2005), in their proposed evidence graph model, 
seek to facilitate the evidence presentation process and pro-
vide an automated intrusion evidence analysis considering 
the firewall output intrusion alerts. Later, Wang and Daniels 
(2006) introduce diffusion and graph spectral methods that 
adopt high-performance computation algorithms. Gladyshev 
(2004) proposes a formalized approach for Event Recon-
struction based on finite state machine model in order to 
define all possible attack scenarios in the computer network 
incidents. Liu et al. (2013) engage algorithms that allow 
integrating different evidence graphs with a probabilistic 
evidence graph with or without the help of a corresponding 
attack. Phillips and Swiler (1998) present an approach for 
network risk analysis based on an attack graph that defines 
the set of attack paths that have a high probability of suc-
cess for the attacker. Sheyner et al. (2002) propose auto-
mated techniques based on a set of algorithms to establish 
the attack graphs associated with specific attack scenarios. 
Eventually, Bruschi et al. (2004) provide a model that can 
organize digital forensics knowledge in a reusable way.
The proposed work adopts brain-like reasoning methods 
to understand the incident-related events and information. 
Furthermore, it combines bio-inspired approaches with 
graph-theoretic approaches to provide more accurate and 
efficient investigation results.
3.3  Threat intelligence
When an organization is threatened, or is about to be threat-
ened, some events could be identified by checking the net-
work or operating system. An instance of such event is called 
an indicator of compromise (IoC), and could be considered 
as the main core of cyber threat intelligence. The benefits 
of sharing this data are very considerable, especially when 
these operations, both for processing and sharing, could be 
done in an automated way, to speed up the entire process. 
Widely used standards for describing cyber threat intelli-
gence, in a very detailed way using a common format as 
XML and JSON, are CybOX/STIX (OASIS 2017a, b, c, d, 
e), OpenIOC (2017), IODEF (Danyliw et al. 2007), CAPEC 
(2017) and MAEC (2016). Contrarily, a common transport 
mechanism for sharing this information is TAXII (OASIS 
2017f), which aims to enable timely and secure sharing of 
threat information in cyber defender communities. It was 
developed by MITRE organization and considered a lot in 
the recent past due to its capability to suit very well with 
other standards, used for describing threat, developed by 
the same organization, such as CybOX, STIX, MAEC and 
CAPEC, allowing creating, processing and sharing very 
detailed and specific IoC, often related to Tactics, Tech-
niques and Procedures (TTP) of an attacker. Another stand-
ard, which belongs to this category is the Traffic Light Pro-
tocol (TLP) (2017), which is more a set of designations for 
sharing sensitive information with the appropriate audience 
rather than a proper transport mechanism. However, these 
standards do not allow defining trust and sharing agree-
ments, as well as access control limitations.
The proposed CyberSANE approach aims at defin-
ing advanced threat models, capable of capturing the new 
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communication (e.g. IoT connectivity, systems interconnec-
tivity) and computation (e.g. cloud services, use of semi-
trusted mobile devices) paradigms in IT services, and to 
identify hidden attack vectors, indirect and subliminal attack 
paths, as those utilized by Advanced Persistent Threats, ran-
somware and botnets.
3.4  Secure and privacy‑aware information sharing
One of the most important challenges related to threat intel-
ligence sharing regards the potential presence of sensitive 
data. Involved parties must be able to protect it and, for this 
reason, intelligence sharing must be performed in a private 
and confidential-enabled way, assuring secure internet shar-
ing and preserving privacy of sensitive information. Moreo-
ver, with the new EU General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR), new challenges have to be addressed, as described 
in Sullivan and Burger (2017). Considering a threat intel-
ligence sharing scenario, particular principles must be fol-
lowed (Fisk et al. 2015), in order to reduce the risk of data 
exposure and help managing trust requirements. In this shar-
ing environment, information exchanged must be expressed 
through specific formats and standards, in order to achieve 
interoperability, speeding up processing and analysis phases 
on the receiver side. For this reason, a particular emphasis 
should be given to privacy-preserving techniques applied 
to structured data, as, for example, in Ulltveit-Moe et al. 
(2013), where an architecture and a methodology for privacy 
handling in Critical Information Infrastructures is proposed, 
focusing upon policy-controlled authorization, anonymiza-
tion and encryption of information in XML element, which 
is the format used in very popular threat intelligence stand-
ards such as STIX, just for versions up to 1.2, and IODEF. 
Another example is presented in De Fuentes et al. (2016), 
which proposes a protocol that provides privacy-preserving 
and agreeable cybersecurity information sharing, by leverag-
ing existing format-preserving and homomorphic encryption 
techniques and adapting them to the particularities of stand-
ard message formats, such as the previous mentioned STIX. 
Finally, issues associated to the realization of an efficient 
and effective information sharing paradigms for actionable 
intelligence have been studied, focusing also on architec-
tural solutions for ensuring privacy, considering many dif-
ferent standards for representing cyber threat information 
(Mohaisen et al. 2017).
Considering that threat incident and intelligence informa-
tion could potentially contain sensitive data, the proposed 
CyberSANE approach, employs secure and privacy-aware 
sharing methods, such as data anonymization, document 
sanitization and implementation of cryptographic primitives 
and protocols, to ensure the secure distribution and storage 
of all forensic artifacts. In this regard, controller/proces-
sor capabilities will be deployed in the context of GDPR, 
allowing security experts to specify all the protection steps 
that have to be performed along with the required condi-
tions to execute them and to implement incident handling 
business-logic decisions that will provide the establishment 
of a secure environment over the heterogeneous and complex 
interconnected CIIs.
4  CyberSANE incident handling approach
The proposed incident handling approach aims at providing 
a step-by-step guidance to manage incidents and breaches on 
CIIs occurred due to cyber attacks. On this account, Cyber-
SANE aims to combine active approaches, that are used to 
detect and analyse anomaly activities and attacks in real-
time, with reactive approaches that analyse the underlying 
infrastructure to assess an incident. Thus, the CyberSANE 
approach is capable of providing a holistic and integrated 
approach to incident handling. In this vein, CyberSANE 
aims to enhance the incident detection capabilities of the 
existing methods described in the previous section with a 
more efficient, elastic and scalable reasoning approach. The 
main characteristics of the proposed approach are the follow-
ing: (1) learning from unstructured data without the need to 
understand the content; (2) identification of unusual activi-
ties that match the structural patterns of possible intrusions 
(instead of predefined rules); and (3) automatic identification 
and adaption to a change of the underlying infrastructure.
CyberSANE treats the handling of a cyber incident as a 
dynamic experimental environment that can be optimized 
involving all relevant CII operators and security experts. 
The CyberSANE approach is based on simulations to facil-
itate the evaluation and analysis of an identified incident 
and support the investigation decision making process in 
a rigorous manner. The pursuit of CyberSANE is to sup-
port the incident handling process with advanced correlation 
capabilities in terms of accuracy and efficiency strengthen-
ing the rational analysis. In this context, CyberSANE relies 
on existing techniques of pioneering mathematical models 
(Blowers and Williams 2014) (e.g. machine learning, deep 
learning and Global Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques) 
for analysing, compiling, combining and correlating all 
incident-related information and data from different levels 
and contexts (e.g. taking into consideration information, 
data and opinions collected and analysed from existing risk 
assessment frameworks (including the CYSM, MEDUSA, 
MITIGATE and SAURON approaches (Papastergiou and 
Polemi 2017, 2018; Kalogeraki et al. 2018), knowledge and 
information acquired from previous incident investigations 
as well as evidential data extracted from the compromised 
cyber systems). Thus, these techniques will be able to iden-
tify, extract and analyse the most relevant parts of the infor-
mation related to the initial incident, in order to find the 
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relationships between the compromised devices/systems and 
these evidences.
Moreover, efficient simulation experiments for generating 
multi-order evidence dependencies have been used to gen-
erate and construct secure, reliable and valid chains of evi-
dence anticipating how the attack is progressing. In particu-
lar, CyberSANE acknowledges that the process of attacks 
scenarios reconstruction from both collected structured data 
(i.e., alarms, alerts, logs) and unstructured data (e.g. data 
coming from social networks such as tweets, discussions 
on forums) requires brain-like reasoning to understand the 
incident-related events and information. In this context, 
CyberSANE will adopt Bio-inspired approaches (Floreano 
and Mattiussi 2008) to self-organizing all relevant events 
and creating the linkage between them. Additionally, it will 
visualize the evidence and attack scenario on the underlying 
CIIs using and combining several types of graphs, including 
scenario graphs, logic exploitation graphs, forensics graphs, 
attack graphs, and evidence graphs. Additionally, taking into 
account the effects of a security incident, real-time insights, 
alerts and warnings will be produced to increase situation 
awareness, inform the CII stakeholders about the effects of 
the events and guide them how to react.
CyberSANE incorporates innovative Intelligence and 
Information Sharing models that disseminate and share 
information on useful incident-related information with 
relevant parties (e.g. industry cooperation groups, Com-
puter Security Incident Response Teams - CSIRTs) about 
the effects and danger of incidents and the characterized 
diffusing threats. The adopted model includes the security 
and privacy-aware sharing capabilities required, consider-
ing that shared incident-related information may potentially 
contain sensitive data. As stated in Sect. 3.4, many works 
have already addressed this topic, especially focusing on pri-
vacy-preserving, such as anonymization or pseudo anonymi-
zation, and encryption techniques, applied on structured 
information, expressed through specific standards, such as 
STIX (OASIS 2017e), which is actually the most used by 
organizations and governments. However, most of the works 
done so far in this field, take into consideration simple use 
cases or, even worse, old versions of them and this is a high 
limitation, considering that, at their full potential, they do 
not allow to describe in a very detailed way cyber security 
incidents and threats, as well as software vulnerabilities and 
tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) of attackers.
5  CyberSANE incident handling system
CyberSANE System is the implementation of the aforemen-
tioned approach; an innovative, knowledge based, collabora-
tive security and response dynamic system which incorpo-
rates all phases of the Cyber incident handling lifecycle for 
handling incidents, incident detection, analysis activities and 
post-incident knowledge harvesting.
The main goal of the CyberSANE system is to increase 
the agility of the investigators and encourage continuous 
learning throughout the incident life cycle. In particular, the 
proposed system aims to improve, intensify and coordinate 
the overall security efforts for the effective and efficient iden-
tification; investigation, mitigation and reporting of realistic 
multi-dimensional attacks within the interconnected web of 
the cyber assets of the CIIs and security events. To realize 
this objective, the CyberSANE system is empowered with 
the newest techniques in prevention, detection and mitiga-
tion of cyber-threats, including the understanding of syn-
thetic cyberspace through the use of Advanced Visualization 
Techniques (immersive interfaces, cyber 3D models, etc.). 
These visualization approaches will help CII operators to 
better comprehend the situation and to detect some traces/
details that could allow them to provide incident analysis 
in-depth and thus to detect a potential threat/attack.
In order to capture all the CyberSANE system require-
ments, Gürses et al. (2005) requirements elicitation process 
is followed. Moreover, the elicitation, analysis and the docu-
mentation of requirements, is focused on capturing the per-
spectives of technical professionals, such as software devel-
opers and system engineers, who cooperate with system’s 
end users to discover problems that have to be solved. The 
requirements elicitation process includes but is not limited 
to what the proposed system should provide, what are the 
expected services, the required characteristics and software 
constraints etc. To this intent, targeted questionnaires were 
developed, aiming at collecting feedback from various CIIs 
operators. These questionnaires serve mainly the purpose 
of corroborating the requirements elicited, but they are also 
used as a communication measure and feedback collection. 
In this respect, a number of questionnaire replies was gath-
ered (approximately 30 questionnaires from organizations 
coming from various critical sectors, banking, maritime, 
transportation, healthcare, energy).
From technical perspective, the system is composed of 
five core components: (1) the Live Security Monitoring and 
Analysis (LiveNet), which is able to monitor, analyze, and 
visualize organizations’ internal live network traffic in real 
time, (2) the Deep and Dark Web mining and intelligence 
(DarkNet), which monitors the Dark and Deep Web as a 
means to grasp and analyse the big picture of global malware 
cybersecurity activities, (3) the Data Fusion, Risk Evaluation 
and Event Management (HybridNet), which receives secu-
rity related information on potential cyber threats from both 
LiveNet and Darknet accordingly with the view to analyze 
and evaluate the security situation inside an organization, 
(4) the Intelligence and Information Sharing and Dissemi-
nation (ShareNet), which disseminates and shares informa-
tion of useful incident-related information to relevant parties 
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and (5) the Privacy and Data Protection (PrivacyNet) that 
undertakes the responsibility to collect, compile, process 
and fuse all the incident-related information in a way that 
their integrity and validity is well preserved. Figures 1 and 2 
depict the CyberSANE Incident Handling approach and the 
CybeSANE system along with its main parts respectively. 
The following sections provide a detailed description of the 
five CyberSANE system core components.
5.1  Live security monitoring and analysis (LiveNet) 
component
The LiveNet is an advanced and scalable Live Security 
Monitoring and Analysis component capable of prevent-
ing and detecting threats and, in case of a declared attack, 
capable of mitigating the effects of an infection/intrusion. 
The main objective of this component is to implement the 
Identification, Extraction, Transformation, and Load pro-
cess for collecting and preparing all the relevant information, 
serving as the interface between the underlying CIIs and 
the CyberSANE system. It includes proper cyber security 
monitoring sensors with network-based Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDS), innovative Anomaly detection modules and 
endpoint protection solutions for accessing and extracting 
information, on a real-time basis, in order to detect complex 
and large-scale attacks (e.g. Advanced Persistent Threats). 
The incident-related information that reside in different and 
heterogeneous cyber systems may include various types of 
data, such as: active (unpatched) vulnerabilities in the tech-
nological infrastructure; misuse detection in the network or 
in the systems, including both host-based and network-based 
IDS deployment and integration; anomaly detection in the 
network or in the systems; system availability signals; net-
work usage and bandwidth monitoring; industry proprietary 
protocol anomalies; SCADA vulnerabilities, etc.
LiveNet incorporates appropriate data management and 
reasoning capabilities for: (1) near real-time identification 
of anomalies, threats, risks and faults and the appropriate 
reactions; (2) proactive reaction to threats and attacks; and 
(3) dynamic decision making in micro, macro and global 
level according to the end user’s needs and the identified 
incidents/threats. These capabilities are empowered with 
existing innovative algorithms based on techniques such as 
machine learning, deep learning and AI that identify previ-
ously unknown attacks. This component provides an abstrac-
tion of the collected information to the Data Fusion, Risk 
Evaluation and Event Management (HybridNet) component 
of the CyberSANE system. Moreover, all incidents-related 
Fig. 1  CyberSANE incident handling approach
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information captured from LiveNet will be parsed, filtered, 
harmonized and enriched to ensure that only the data neces-
sary for the multivariate and multidimensional analysis are 
available to the other components (e.g. HybridNet). Thus, 
LiveNet contributes as follows: (1) preventing a flood of 
irrelevant or repeated information from cluttering the Hyb-
ridNet processing component; and (2) consolidating the dif-
ferent data contents and formats towards a uniform perspec-
tive in order to provide the upper components a unified and 
convenient way to handle the information.
5.2  Deep and dark web mining and intelligence 
(DarkNet) component
The Deep and Dark Web mining and intelligence (Dark-
Net) component provides the appropriate Social Informa-
tion Mining capabilities that will allow the exploitation 
and analysis of security, risks and threats related informa-
tion embedded in user-generated content (UGC). This is 
achieved via the analysis of both the textual and meta-data 
content available from such streams. Textual information 
is processed to extract data from otherwise disparate and 
distributed sources that may offer unique insights on pos-
sible cyber threats. Examples include the identification of 
situations that can become a threat for the CIIs with sig-
nificant legal, regulatory and technical considerations. 
Such situations are: organization of hacktivist activities in 
underground forums or IRC channels; external situations 
that can become a potential threat to the CIIs (e.g. relevant 
geopolitical changes); disclosure of zero day vulnerabilities; 
sockpuppets impersonating real profiles in social networks 
etc. Entities (e.g., events, places) and security-realated infor-
mation will be uniquely extracted from textual content using 
advanced Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques, 
such as sentiment analysis.
5.3  Data fusion, risk evaluation and event 
management (HybridNet) component
The Data Fusion, Risk Evaluation and Event Management 
(HybridNet) component provides the intelligence needed 
to perform effective and efficient analysis of a security 
event based on: (1) information derived and acquired by 
the LiveNet and DarkNet components; and (2) informa-
tion and data produced and extracted from this component. 
In particular, HybridNet component retrieves incidents-
related data via the LiveNet component from the underly-
ing CIIs and data from unstructured and structured sources 
(e.g. from Deep and Dark Web) consolidated in a unified 
longitudinal view which are linked, analysed and corre-
lated, in order to achieve semantic meaning and provide 
a more comprehensive and detailed view of the incident. 
Fig. 2  CyberSANE system and components
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In CyberSANE, a formal and uniform representation of 
digital evidence along with their relationships has been 
used to encapsulate all concepts of the forensic field and 
provide a common understanding of the structure of all 
information linking to evidence among the CIIs’ opera-
tors and the forensics investigators. The main goal of the 
analysis process is to continuously carry out the assess-
ment (e.g. identification of on-going attacks and related 
information, such as what is the stage of the attack and 
where is the attacker) and prediction (i.e. identification 
of possible scenarios of future attacks through forecast-
ing models). HybridNet incorporates fusion models based 
on existing mathematical models (e.g. data mining, AI, 
deep learning, machine learning and visualization tech-
niques). These models will support and provide reasoning 
capabilities for the near real-time identification of anoma-
lies, threats and attacks, assessing any possible malicious 
actions in the cyber assets such as abnormal behaviors or 
malicious connections to identify unusual activities that 
match the structural patterns of possible intrusions.
In order to meet its objectives, the HybridNet will con-
sist of three elements Anomaly Detection Engine, Incident 
Analysis & Respond and Decision-Making, Warning and 
Notification which are further described below.
The Anomaly Detection Engine will undertake the 
responsibility to process a large amount of data delivered 
from the abovementioned components. The objective of this 
engine is to analyse the received data in order to further 
evaluate and correlate attack-related patterns associated with 
specific malicious or anomalous activities in the CIIs. Thus, 
when the engine identifies unusual activities that match the 
structural patterns of possible intrusions, generates alerts to 
show that these activities require a more intensified analysis.
Once an event has been considered by the Anomaly Detec-
tion Engine as a real security incident, the Incident Analysis 
& Respond element is responsible to further investigate it. 
The analysis is performed based on data and information 
produced from the following subsystems: (1) the Collabora-
tive Evidence-based Risk Assessment subsystem implements 
the main steps required for the identification, evaluation and 
mitigation of all vulnerabilities, threats and risks associated 
with the CIIs, in a graphical way using visualization tools, 
simulation processes, automated routines and structured 
content. (2) The Collective Intelligence and Big-Data Ana-
lytics subsystem implements a wide array of reasoning, data 
mining and big data analytics techniques which will incorpo-
rate and leverage a variety of data sources and data types in 
order to enhance and optimize the investigation, analysis and 
response of a security incident. (3) The Model Processing 
Management subsystem includes a variety of modeling tools 
and methods in order to easily visualize CIIs and identify all 
type of interdependencies (at physical, system, technology 
and business levels).
Finally, the Decision-Making, Warning and Notification 
element is responsible to orchestrate and facilitate the anal-
ysis, which includes the scrutiny of the attacker’s actions 
and identification of the means that were employed by the 
attacker, and in overall and understanding of how the attack 
originated and evolved. This subsystem takes into account 
the incident-related information processed by the Anomaly 
Detection Engine and the Incident Analysis & Respond in 
order to design and execute the necessary simulation experi-
ments through the Security Incident/Attack Simulation Envi-
ronment and the Behavior Simulation Environment.
The Security Incident/Attack Simulation Environment 
comprises a set of novel mathematical instruments, includ-
ing mathematical models for simulating, analysing, optimiz-
ing, validating, monitoring simulation data and optimizing 
security incident handling process. Specifically, these instru-
ments include: (1) a bundle of novel process/attack analysis 
and simulation techniques for designing, executing, analyz-
ing and optimizing threat and attack simulation experiments 
that will produce appropriate evidence and information that 
facilitate the identification, assessment and mitigation of 
the CII-related risks; (2) graph theory to implement attack 
graph generation, to perform security incident analysis and 
to strengthen the prognosis of future malefactor steps; (3) 
pioneering mathematical techniques for analyzing, compil-
ing and combining information and evidences about security 
incidents and attacks/threats patterns and paths in order to 
find relationships between the recovered forensic artefacts 
and piecing the evidential data together to develop a set of 
useful chain of evidence (linked evidence) associated with a 
specific incident; (4) innovative simulation techniques which 
will optimize the automatic analysis of diverse data; (5) 
innovative techniques in order to link optimization and sim-
ulation. In this context, this simulation environment is fed 
with information about an incident and proceeds to calculate 
and generate a number of possible attack graphs (routes of 
possible attacks) and graphs of linked evidence (chains of 
evidence) and also compute probabilities for a sequence of 
events on top of these graphs. The resulting probabilistic 
estimate for the compromised CIIs’ assets will be used to 
identify, model and represent the course of an attack as it 
propagates across the CIIs. It should be noted the Hybrid-
Net component continuously updates the simulation engine 
with information collected and piece of information, thereby 
enabling both understanding which assets might have been 
compromised, as well as gain more accurate estimates on 
the likelihood that other assets might be compromised in 
the future.
The second simulation environment is the Behavior Simu-
lation Environment that aims to stimulate the behavior of 
CIIs’ operators and Treat Actors taking into consideration 
their cyber interactions and interdependencies to measure 
the cascading effects of various cyber-attack patterns and 
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security incidents within the digital ecosystem. Based on 
the estimated effects, the environment is able to formulate 
extensive plans to mitigate the effects of such incidents.
5.4  Intelligence and information sharing 
and dissemination (ShareNet) component
The ShareNet component provides the necessary threat intel-
ligence and information sharing capabilities within the CIIs 
and with relevant parties (e.g. industry cooperation groups, 
CSIRTs). It is responsible for the instantiation of the adopted 
intelligence model; in particular, ShareNet undertakes the 
identification and dissemination of, the right and sanitized 
information that have to be shared in a usable format and in 
a timely manner. This environment produces and circulates 
notifications containing critical information, enhancing the 
perception of the current situation and improving the pro-
jection into the future. It should be noted that all potential 
evidence from the systems that are suspected to be part of 
the infrastructure being investigated are forensically cap-
tured, stored and exchanged in a way that their integrity is 
maintained using the security and data protection methods 
of the PrivacyNet Orchestrator.
To this end, ShareNet follows a trusted and distributed 
intelligence and incident sharing approach to facilitate and 
promote the collaboration and secure and privacy-aware 
information sharing of the CIIs’ operators with relevant par-
ties (e.g. industry cooperation groups, CSIRTs), in order to 
exchange risk incident-related information, through specific 
standards and/or formats (STIX) (OASIS 2017a, b, c, d, e), 
improving overall cyber risk understanding and reduction. 
Privacy preserving is another important issue considered at 
every phase of sharing, applying methods such as anonymi-
zation or pseudo anonymization and encryption techniques 
incorporated in and made available from PrivacyNet Orches-
trator. This brings forward a mixture of several crypto-
graphic techniques that holds certain security guarantees.
5.5  Privacy and data protection (PrivacyNet) 
Orchestrator
Through the specific “Privacy and Data Protection Orches-
trator” (PrivacyNet), it is possible to coordinate the above-
mentioned components of the CyberSANE system in order 
to ensure desired-levels of data protection for sensitive 
incident-related information, enabling the possibility to 
apply such protection in all phases of cyber security inci-
dent handling flow. The main purpose the PrivacyNet is 
to manage and orchestrate the application of the innova-
tive privacy mechanisms and maximize achievable levels 
of confidentiality and data protection towards compliance 
with the highly-demanding provisions in the GDPR in the 
context of protecting sensitive incident-related information 
within and outside CIIs. To this end, PrivacyNet sets up 
the security and data “protection configurations” allowing 
security experts and members of the incident response team 
to specify all the protection steps that have to be performed 
and the required conditions to execute them, which can be 
referred to GDPR-based rules (and to other guidance for its 
application by the European Data Protection Board, formerly 
Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party).
In addition, the orchestration approach of the CyberSANE 
allows applying the most appropriate security and data pro-
tection methods depending on the user’s privacy require-
ments, which cover a wide range of techniques including 
anonymization, location privacy, obfuscation, pseudonymi-
zation, searchable encryption, multi-party computation and 
verifiable computation, in order to meet the highly demand-
ing regulatory compliance obligations, for example in rela-
tion to accountability towards data protection supervisory 
authorities, for adequate management of informed consent 
etc. For this reason, novel techniques and processes for 
enhancing the secure distribution and storage of all forensic 
artifacts in order to protect them from unauthorized dele-
tion, tampering revision and sharing (e.g. Attribute-based 
Encryption (ABE) and block-chain technologies) have been 
combined.
6  Data flow and system operation 
of the CyberSANE components
The CyberSANE approach aims to assist all the phases of 
cybersecurity assessment and reduction of cyber risks on rel-
evant operational scenarios, such as those that are described 
in the next section. Figure 3 illustrates the data flows and the 
inherent connections between the CyberSANE core compo-
nents, which are enumerated in a subsequent step format and 
presented in the following. In the perception phase (step 1), 
members of the incident response team of the CIIs use the 
CyberSANE’s LiveNet Component for extracting all source 
data (e.g. their servers, systems, logs) and discovered the 
required evidence, such as changes in the backend servers, 
traces of suspicious traffic as well as malicious software 
or back door Trojan installation. Thus, they can conclude 
whether their organization has fallen victim to a cyber-
attack. However, at this stage with current technologies they 
are unable to identify exactly how the intrusion happened, or 
who the attackers were. The CyberSANE system helps with 
that through the LiveNet components, which undergoes a 
transformation process following a common semantic for-
mat, allowing collected incidents-related information (opera-
tional/static/network traffic data, existing vulnerabilities) to 
be parsed, filtered, harmonized and enriched, fed and fused 
to CyberSANE’s HybridNet Component (step 2). HybridNet 
is responsible to correlate real-time information fed by the 
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LiveNet (step 3). with the most updated information about 
latest mechanisms of cyber-attacks collected by DarkNet 
(step 4) in order to carry out the investigation of the iden-
tified incident. In particular, HybridNet uses the collected 
operational data that describes the configuration of systems 
and software (e.g., network topologies and existing vulner-
abilities), static data that describe general risk (e.g., if an 
identified vulnerability has an exploit that is publicly avail-
able), operational network traffic logs corresponding to the 
studied systems and software as well as information about 
malicious activities published in underground forums to 
calculate an attack graph and compute a Bayesian Network 
on top of this attack graph (Reazul et al. 2017). Using the 
produced graphs combined with non-technical factors (e.g. 
adversaries’ intensions), the services begin to map out all 
systems/devices (e.g. the container management system or 
the energy management sensors) needed to be analysed and 
prompt to capture as much information as possible related 
to these systems and network. After this planning stage, 
HybridNet utilizes LiveNet components start collecting rel-
evant information (e.g. any traffic identified as malicious) 
which could be useful for the investigation (e.g. Keywords, 
IP/MAC addresses) and will support the evaluation process 
(step 5). The resulting data are used to re-generate and re-
calculate the graphs and the Bayesian Networks correspond-
ing to this new piece of information, thereby enabling both 
understanding which assets might have been compromised 
and which vulnerabilities were exploited (step 6). In this 
way, these services enable the victims to identify all evi-
dence related to the initial incident, to discover and depict 
the relationships between devices and the evidence and 
to produce a timeline of the incident, including a map of 
affected devices and chains of evidence (step 7). In addition, 
HybridNet assesses threats in terms of estimating the prob-
ability that some actor will initiate a cyber-attack by tak-
ing non-technical factors, such as intent, into account (step 
8). The probability estimates is used compare mitigation 
strategies and de-risking steps in order to find the most cost-
efficient actions to implement (step 9). HybridNet proposes 
mitigation strategies and re-risking steps at multiple levels 
(step 10). In this case, relevant de-risking actions include: 
patching existing vulnerabilities, investing in a better intru-
sion detection system, implementing new policy’s/proce-
dures and getting a new tailor made insurance (step 11). 
Now, having understood the cause of the incident, Cyber-
SANE system uses the PrivacyNet to apply the appropriate 
security and data protection mechanisms in order to guar-
antee the secure communication, maintenance and storage 
of the incident-related information (step 12). Finally, the 
anonymized incident-related information will be shared with 
and distributed to accredited CSIRTs in order to enhance the 
cyber security aware (step 13).
7  Cyber‑attack showcase scenarios
As aforementioned, CyberSANE will be applicable to vari-
ous security scenarios of CIIs’. In order to evaluate the pro-
posed solution, CyberSANE system will be validated in the 
scope of three realistic cyber-attacks and incident manage-
ment showcases scenarios described in the following sec-
tions, covering three (3) industry sectors: energy, transpor-
tation and healthcare, which are critical according to the 
Council Directive 2008/114/EC (2008) and to the Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 7 (Homeland Security 2003).
These critical sectors have been selected as a suitable test 
bed for the CyberSANE platform. In the context of cyber-
security, there are not major differences between different 
domains (e.g. transportation, airport, energy, telco, health-
care and maritime) and all of them are facing similar security 
challenges. Therefore, the generic nature of the CyberSANE 
approach is envisaged to render it applicable to a variety of 
Critical Information Infrastructures of different sizes and 
different business activities. Furthermore, the CyberSANE 
Fig. 3  Data flows and operation 
of the CyberSANE system’s 
core components
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system can be used by various organizations coming from 
multiple sectors to handle cyberscurity incidents and manage 
the security risks of their ICT environments.
Within this framework, a number of use cases will be 
run to ensure the system is functioning properly works as 
intended and to validate the system’s capability for detecting 
and preventing any types of malicious activities that may 
allow the adversaries to launch and conduct attacks on the 
CIIs. It should be noted that these scenarios were identified 
as critical to security and economics taking into considera-
tion knowledge gained from various research activities deal-
ing with CIIs security and protection (i.e. CORE, MEDUSA, 
MITIGATE and SAURON). In addition, the targeted sce-
narios play a central role in the assessment and validation 
of CyberSANE’s proposed innovations.
The showcases presented in the following, engage secu-
rity operations in heterogeneous, large-scale, cross-border 
CIIs, that are characterized by the following features: (1) 
complex, highly distributed, and large-scale cyber systems 
(including IoT and cyberphysical) regarding the number of 
entities involved; (2) heterogeneity of the underlying net-
works interconnecting the physical-cyber systems; and (3) 
different levels of exposure to attacks.
7.1  Scenario 1: “solar energy production, storage 
and distribution service”
In the era of Smart Energy, various energy providers have 
developed and offered advanced and innovative energy pro-
duction, storage and distribution services. To this end, they 
operate disruptive, transformational and intelligent energy 
management solutions and offer a number of digital ser-
vices on top, helping energy “procumers”, utilities and grid 
operators to optimize power flows, secure the electricity 
grid and finally reduce the cost of electricity. Such solutions 
incorporate a bundle of components such as: a range of web 
apps for the end user that enable users to see in real time 
the power flow between the solar system, the battery and 
the grid of their household; intermediate devices between 
sensors, smart meters, inverters, the battery and appliances 
to collect and monitor the data; smart grid networks of a 
population of distributed and interconnected assets; back-
office applications which automate the entire process of the 
business; electric panels designed to accelerate the installa-
tion process of the system and eliminate connectivity errors 
etc. Figure 4 depicts the Solar Energy Production, Storage 
and Distribution Service.
Attacks on “Solar Energy Production, Storage and Dis-
tribution Service”: various combined cyber-attacks may 
affect the examined solar energy service. From the cyber 
part, attacks against back-end components such as gaining 
unauthenticated remote access to IoT components and other 
entities to disrupt services and change their data set points 
or state. Other cyber-attacks may target against the IT and 
communication systems that are used to process the sensed 
data and transmit them to the corresponding IT systems.
7.2  Scenario 2: “container cargo transportation 
service”
Nowadays, commercial ports are considered as the pri-
mary “hubs” within the larger network of flows and inter-
actions and are at the core of the national, regional and 
European economic recovery. The automation of port 
terminal and intermodal handling operations is very 
important and requires the use of highly complex and 
involve numerous different systems. In order to meet their 
objectives, the commercial ports operate over three main 
family of systems: Information Technology (IT) systems 
which includes databases with operational and business 
Fig. 4  Solar energy production, storage & distribution service
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information, Operational Technology (OT) systems like 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) sys-
tems, which control physical processes e.g. unloading 
from the vessel is performed by yard tractors and forklifts 
with their auxiliary equipment, which are monitored by a 
SCADA system, and the Port Community System (PCS) 
which generally supports port’s services such as manage-
ment of docking and shipping of vessels. Any attack to the 
above mentioned systems may result in a serious threat 
to the correct functioning of the port and in consequence 
for the national security. Figure 5 presents the Container 
Cargo Transportation Service.
Attacks on “Container Cargo Transportation Service”: 
the Container Cargo Transportation Service can be subject 
of a number of possible threat scenarios that can be real-
ized by conducting a combination/series of specific cyber 
attacks in port’s IT component. In this context, malicious 
users/adversaries are able to realize complex threat scenarios 
for the purpose of disrupting port’s operations or facilitating 
illegal activities (such as smuggle illegal material of any 
kinds (such as drugs, weapons etc.) or illegal immigrants, 
or event to destroy a major/critical Infrastructure) aimed 
at obtaining financial, political/military or even ideologi-
cal gain and benefits. To this end, malicious attackers can 
launch targeted attacks in order to gain unauthorized access 
to the victims’ systems and use them as stepping stone to 
launch further, more sophisticated, attacks and go deeper 
into their cyber infrastructure. For example, they can infil-
trate the port’s wireless by obtaining the network identifier 
or through other network vulnerabilities in order to sniff, 
modify or inject falsified data to achieve the expected results. 
In addition, they can continue to exploit other vulnerabilities 
in various systems, either in the corporate network or the 
SCADA network, to gain unauthorized access to places such 
as corporate networks, SCADA systems, interconnections, 
and access links. Therefore, the adversary can target the 
Port Community System of the port and takes advantage of 
specific software bugs and flaws that may have. In this way, 
the attacker can interfere with the authorization process, 
allowing a vessel carrying illegal or hazardous materials to 
enter and dock at the port or even to bypass the inspection 
procedure.
7.3  Scenario 3: “real‑time patient monitoring 
and treatment service”
Over the past decade, the medical field has experienced 
a massive digitization. Electronic Health Record (EHR)/
Electronic Medical Record (EMR) have appeared and clini-
cal processes have been automated. Modern digital health 
care organizations rely more and more on the aid of tech-
nological advancement including IoT, Cloud Computing, 
Big Data, and advances on medical equipment to increase 
the degree of flexibility, scalability, and efficiency in the 
communication and coordination of health care services. In 
particular, in order to automatically collect and process the 
medical data, various medical devices and instruments are 
connected, through wired or wireless communications, with 
the EHR/EMR systems (Stellios et al. 2018). For example, 
smart insertable cardiac monitoring devices beds may be 
connected to automatically inform the doctors with patient 
data, or they may be used by nurses to note the daily treat-
ment/medicines received by a patient. Also, medical instru-
ments such as medical radiation devices can be connected to 
EHR/EMR IT systems to assist doctors during medical treat-
ment. Other IT equipment may involve secondary services, 
such as web presence. Outside the hospital, various medical 
Internet of Things (IoT) technologies can also be used to 
extend the medical services provided. For example, Implant-
able and Wearable Medical Devices (IMD/WMD) can be 
used to monitor (sense) patient data and also to remotely 
treat a patient in emergency situations, such as inject insulin 
when the sensed data indicate that this is urgent. The IMD/
WMD devices may be controlled by home monitoring or 
programming devices, which communicate with the IMD/
WMD using short-range wireless communication protocols, 
while they communicate with the in-hospital EHR/EMR IT 
systems using Internet access (Stellios et al. 2018).
It should be noted that the evolving digital interconnec-
tivity has also changed the threat landscape, producing a 
Fig. 5  Container cargo transportation service
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wide range of security and privacy challenges and increasing 
the danger of potential cybersecurity attacks in the digital 
healthcare ecosystem. In fact, the situation regarding cyber-
security in healthcare facilities is quite alarming, with the 
number of attacks and breaches related to health care infra-
structures growing. Figure 6 illustrates the Real-Time Patient 
Monitoring and Treatment Service.
Attacks on “Real-time patient monitoring and treatment 
service”: the Patient Monitoring Service is subject to vari-
ous cyber-attacks on both sides. At the hospital side, EHR/
EMR IT and file systems are very attractive targets for ran-
somware attacks, due to their importance for all medical 
data and services (Stellios et al. 2018). Also, privacy loss 
is highly important, due to privacy regulations. However, 
various Internet connected medical devices with IoT capa-
bilities are easy entry points for hackers, due to their low 
security level (Stellios et al. 2018). In real security events, 
such medical devices have been used by hackers as an entry 
point in order to escalate their access and attack their actual 
target IT systems or to exfiltrate sensitive data. On the user 
side, the use of vulnerable wireless communications can 
(and in many real cases has) been used in order to attack the 
Service and even cause physical damage to a patient. For 
example, according to Stellios et al. (2018) by replaying or 
by manipulating commands at the API used by the IMD/
WMD devices, it is possible to inject commands that may 
change the dosage of an insulin pump, thus directly affecting 
the health of the patient.
7.4  Benefits and added value of employing 
CyberSANE on the showcases scenarios
Although the presence of such large number of intercon-
nected ICT components, complex ICT infrastructures and 
emerging technologies (e.g. IoT) as described in the three 
above scenarios, have significant benefits for CIIs’ operators, 
there are also significant risks and potential vulnerabilities, 
which CyberSANE will explore through the application of 
the CyberSANE system and accompanying components to 
the above use cases:
• Various Internet connected systems (e.g. energy manage-
ment sensors or medical devices with IoT capabilities) 
are also easy entry points for attackers, due to their low 
security level. In real security incidents such systems 
(e.g. IoT devices have been used by attackers as part of 
APT attacks and as an entry point towards escalating 
their access.
• Most CIIs’ cyber assets are not designed with security in 
mind. Devices are mostly built based on “intended use” 
cases, and what a reasonable person might do. Hacking 
and other network-borne accidents are “unintended use” 
or “abuse” cases. This posture leads to a number of sys-
temic vulnerabilities and risks throughout the CIIs.
• Security decisions made locally for a specific device 
can have global impacts. In many cases devices were 
designed without the specific intent to be connected to a 
network (sometimes specifically intended to remain iso-
lated)—that requirement came later and was bolted on. 
The communication between smart devices and legacy 
systems can also create gaps and give space for malicious 
attackers to gain illegal access to systems and data.
So far, existing HealthCare, Transportation and Energy 
CIIs have made a huge effort in isolating all its systems 
against cyber-attacks, malware strains or many other mali-
cious techniques. In this line, in the aim to fight against 
cyber-attacks and to protect critical national infrastructures, 
they have installed a set of security probes in several points 
of port’s technological ecosystem formed by the IT, OT and 
PCS. These probes are devices or programs that monitor and 
collect network data as well as activity data from systems 
and provide mechanisms for early detection of attacks and 
vulnerabilities of systems in order to quickly proceed with 
counter actions to overcome these threats. Despite the enor-
mous work done in terms of cyber security, there is still a 
Fig. 6  Real-time patient moni-
toring and treatment service
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need for keeping cyber security tools updated in near real 
time (ideally in the range of minutes) as new ways of cyber-
intrusion appear. An over-the-top solution to this problem 
would be to use the CyberSANE’s system in order to corre-
late, through HybridNet, real-time information coming from 
the of-the-self CIIs’ security framework (raw data, processed 
data, local security warnings, security test results, etc.) via 
LiveNet with the most updated information about the latest 
mechanisms of cyber-attacks collected by DarkNet. With 
the CyberSANE system, the CIIs will definitely be able to 
boost the detection process of near future threats and ongo-
ing attacks, as well as to minimize potential damages when 
an attack occurs. At the same time, ShareNet would be able 
to inform about incidents to interested key external players, 
which are connected to CIIs, in order to react on time and 
avoid potential cyber-attack propagations.
The selected showcases engage APT attack scenarios, tar-
get at illustrating how the proposed system can detect and 
respond to advanced, sophisticated attacks in various indus-
try CIIs. Additionally they aim to show how the CybeSANE 
system can be used by industry stakeholders as a tool to get a 
comprehensible insight view of the cybersecurity processes 
in cross-sector partnerships, learn on the existing vulner-
abilities of their operating CIIs and get advised to improve 
the management of cyber security threats.
The validation and evaluation of the CyberSANE system 
will rely on the Validation and Verification best practices 
described by the International Council on Systems Engineer-
ing (INCOSE) (2019) and the Guide to the Systems Engi-
neering Body of Knowledge (SEBoK) (2019) created by the 
Body of Knowledge and Curriculum to Advance Systems 
Engineering (BKCASE) project.
8  Innovative aspects of CyberSANE system
CyberSANE will develop a system that addresses technical 
related to identification, prevention and protection against 
attacks. In particular, the CyberSANE system collects, com-
piles, processed and fuses attack related data from multiple 
perspective, through its main three components: The Live 
Security Monitoring and Analysis (LiveNet) component, 
the Deep and Dark Web mining and Intelligence (DarkNet) 
component and the Data Fusion, Risk Evaluation and Event 
Management (HybridNet) component. In order for these com-
ponents to optimize the identification and analysis of security 
incidents and privacy breaches, they combine existing machine 
learning techniques, such as clustering and hidden Markov 
models (Jain and Abouzakhar 2012), with deep learning and 
Global Artificial Intelligence (AI) to develop an innovative 
way that optimizes the automatic analysis of huge amounts 
of events, information and evidence. To identify malicious 
actions in the cyber assets, such as abnormal behaviours, they 
combine both structured data (e.g. logs and network traffic) 
and unstructured data (e.g. data coming from social networks 
and dark web) in a privacy-aware manner. Furthermore, they 
adopt deep semantic analysis techniques together with Natural 
Language Processing (NLP) methods (e.g. Named Entity Rec-
ognition and Word Sense Disambiguation) to extract important 
information from multilingual security-related contexts, facili-
tating multilingual data generation and exploitation within the 
networked ecosystem.
In addition, the ShareNet component optimizes the col-
laboration and the interaction of the CIIs’ stakeholders with 
relevant parties (e.g. industry cooperation groups, Computer 
Security Incident Response Teams—CSIRTs), in order to 
exchange risk incident-related information, through specific 
standards and/or formats, improving overall cyber risk under-
standing and reduction.
Finally, the PrivacyNet component implements the neces-
sary security and privacy-related algorithms, techniques and 
approaches that ensures that all potential evidence from the 
systems that are suspected to be part of the infrastructure being 
investigated are forensically captured, stored and exchanged in 
a way that their integrity is maintained. Along with encryp-
tion methods (e.g. Attribute-based Encryption (ABE)) that 
have the potential to achieve the privacy and security goals of 
the project, PrivacyNet uses innovative methods (Cresitello-
Dittmar 2016) (e.g. blockchain technologies, anonymization 
techniques) for secure distribution and storage processes, to 
protect all forensic information from deletion, tampering, and 
revision in order the data to be used as evidence in the court.
The abovementioned components are combined with 
innovative visualization techniques based on virtual real-
ity technologies in order to create a multidimensional 
environment that allows the operations managers to have a 
better comprehension of the cyber environment. This new 
approach includes the use of novel immersive HMI for the 
operators in order to give them a new perspective for visual-
izing some parameters or graphs that impede the sensorial 
overload inherent to the large amount of data management 
and analysis process. As “situation awareness” is a decision 
makers’ mental perception, the use of immersive multidi-
mensional HMI allows them to reach the more precise situ-
ation status in order to go beyond and provide the “situation 
understanding” mental perception to the decision makers. 
Thus, the decision makers will be able to take proactive as 
well as reactive decisions for reducing the response time and 
improving the efficiency.
9  Conclusions
Current work presented an innovative, knowledge-based, 
collaborative security and response dynamic approach, 
which engages an overall view of the cyber incident handling 
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lifecycle, in order to detect and handle security incidents, 
scrutinize activities and provide post-incident knowledge 
harvesting. Furthermore, the approach targets at leveraging 
collected security information, for the purpose of finding 
new ways of protection for ICT assets, enabling the entity 
at risk to evaluate the risk and invest to limit that risk in an 
optimal way. The presented work provides a holistic and 
integrated approach of incident handling, which aims to 
enhance the incident detection capabilities of existing meth-
ods with efficient, elastic and scalable reasoning insights. 
On this account, it aims to facilitate the detection and analy-
sis of Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) and anomalous 
activities due to complex cyber attacks on Critical Informa-
tion Infrastructures in the Transportation, Healthcare and 
Energy industries and thus expand the sector awareness on 
cyber threats and risks. Concerning this, the proposed work 
provides a way to securely collect both structured data (e.g. 
logs and network traffic) and unstructured data (e.g. data 
coming from social networks and dark web) making them 
available for analysis, fostering new innovations that will 
only unravel after having access to such data, harnessing its 
full potential. In this vein, CyberSANE’s has a twofold aim; 
to minimize the exposure to security risks/threats and help 
CIIs’ operators to respond successfully to relevant incidents.
The ground-breaking nature of the proposed incident han-
dling approach is based on: (1) the identification of attacks 
and incidents using innovative approaches and algorithms 
of existing unobserved components techniques and linear 
state-space models producing meaningful information from 
cyber systems, (2) the combination of active incident han-
dling approaches with reactive approaches producing real-
time insights, alerts and warnings about cyber events, (3) 
innovative normalization process that unifies all relevant 
incident-related information gathered from heterogeneous 
CIIs, (4) novel attacks scenarios and evidence representa-
tion with simulation techniques and visualization tools that 
increase the efficiency of investigation results, (5) hybridiza-
tion forms of existing mathematical models and combina-
tions of data mining, Global artificial intelligence, machine 
learning that optimize evidential data from different sources.
The presented showcases are real-life demonstration 
scenarios upon which the proposed solution will be evalu-
ated. They have a twofold objective: to illustrate the secu-
rity requirements and challenges in the scope of various 
and different types and architectures of CIIs and to provide 
guidelines for the successful deployment of the CyberSANE 
system. However, as challenges in the context of cybersecu-
rity have not major differences across industries, the Cyber-
SANE solution could be utilized by organizations coming 
from multiple industry sectors.
The CyberSANE approach achieves to combine active 
approaches that are used to detect and analyze anomaly 
activities and attacks in real-time with reactive approaches 
that deals with the analysis of the underlying infrastructure 
to assess an incident in order to provide a more holistic 
and integrated approach to incident handling.
The proposed CyberSANE solution meets its objectives 
embedding core security features allowing faster and bet-
ter operation of advanced cyber security functionalities. 
These aspects comprise an innovative, knowledge based, 
collaborative security and response dynamic system which 
increases the agility of the investigators and encourages 
continuous learning throughout the incident life cycle.
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